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Comments
CAPITAL FORMATION WITHIN THE ELECTRIC
UTILITY INDUSTRY: AN ASSESSMENT
OF THE FORD PLAN*
I-MRODUCTION
The 1973 oil embargo dramatized the need for less dependence
on foreign energy sources.' One way to reduce dependence on for-
eign oil is to construct more electric power plants which are not
fueled by petroleum, but by energy sources plentiful in the United
States, i.e., coal, nuclear, or solar energy. Nevertheless, the utility
industry2 recently has reduced construction, claiming inability to
* The author would like to thank Ms. Penny Parker for having origi-
nally shown him the centrality of capital formation with respect to energy
policy decision-making.
1. But see Barraclough, Wealth and Power: The Politics of Food and
Oil, 22 N.Y. Rzv. oF BooKs, Aug. 7, 1975, at 23, 26-27. See generally The
Oil Crisis: In Perspective, D a.Axus (Fall 1975).
2. Throughout this Comment, the words "utility" and "industry" will
be used interchangeably to mean investor-owned electric utility companies.
In 1973, investor-owned electric utility companies served 78.3 percent of
the total ultimate consumers of electric power. Sales to these consumers
represented 78.3 percent of all kilowatt hours sold. Industry revenue
equaled 26.3 billion dollars. Financial Problems of the Electric Utilities:
Hearings on S. - Before the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs, 93 Cong., - Sess., ser. , pt. , at 441 (statement of Professor
LL. Weidenbaum, Director of the Center for the Study of American Busi-
ness at Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri, and a former Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury for Economic Policy, 1974) reprinted under sep-
February 1976 Vol. 13 No. 2
raise sufficient capital to invest 3 in new power plants.4
In response to this problem, the Ford Administration has pro-
posed a system of tax incentives to encourage the construction of
more nonpetrol based power plants. 5 The Ford plan provides for:
1) An indefinite extension of the investment tax credit at 12 per-
cent; 2) an immediate investment tax credit on progress payments;
3) extension of rapid amortization of pollution control facilities to
January 1, 1981; 4) rapid amortization of conversion costs from
petroleum to nonpetroleum plants; 5) a depreciation allowance for
funds used during construction (AFDC), and 6) postponed taxation
of qualified dividends reinvested in a utility.6
arate cover in M. WEIDENDAVm, FnANCING THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY
441 (Center for the Study of American Business Pub. No. 1, 1975) [here-
inafter cited as WEIDENBAum]. A general outline of the utility industry
may be found in C. PmLLUPs, THE EcoNomcs OF REGULATION 565-608
(1965).
3. -At the end of 1974, it is estimated that electric utilities had deferred
or cancelled the construction of 106 nuclear plants (114,000 megawatts) and
129 coal-fired plants (74413 megawatts). FEA, DRAFT ENvIRoNmENTAL IM-
PACT STATEMENT OF THE ELECTRIC POWER FACILITY CONSTRUCTION INCENTIVES
ACT oF 1975 at 2 (DES 75-4, 1975) on file with the Federal Energy Admin-
istration, 40 Fed. Reg. 34025 (1975) [hereinafter cited as DES 75-4].
4. Wall Street J., July 19, 1974, at 30, col. 1.
5. Tax Reform Hearings: Hearings on Tax Reform and Capital Forma-
tion and Tax Proposals Concerning Electric Utilities Before the House Com-
mittee on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., at 49 (statement of Wil-
liam E. Simon, Secretary of the Treasury, 1975) [hereinafter cited as
Simon].
6. Simon 51-52, reprinted in P-H 1975 FED. TAXES 59,217.1 at 20-21
(Report Bulletin 31, § 2). A previous and slightly different version of this
proposal can be found in CCH 1975 STAND. FED. TAX RE'., vol. 62, no. 7,
pt. 2 at 39 (White House Fact Sheet on the President's State of the Union
Message).
It is doubtful that this specific proposal will be enacted as proposed by
the Administration. Wall Street J., June 16, 1975, at 4, col. 3. Neverthe-
less, the idea of federal assistance for the financing of energy supply ex-
pansion continues to be prominent among top Administration officials.
For example, Vice-President Rockefeller has proposed the creation of an
Energy Resources Finance Corporation (Erfco).
[T]he corporation's purpose would be mainly to aid in development
of such synthetic fuels as oil shale and in making oil and gas from
coal. This would be done through direct loans, loan guarantees or
agreements by the company to buy such fuel and resell it. Wall
Street J., Sept. 10, 1975, at 3, col. 3 (pac. ed.). (The Wall Street
Journal is bound in the eastern edition).
In addition, Erfco would incorporate the present proposals to assist utility
financing. Id.
The House Ways and Means Committee has not acted on the Ford pro-
posal as a whole. On October 28, 1975 the Committee staff was prepared
to present the Ford plan to the full Committee. In an unusual move, the
Republican members of the Committee did not move the initiative. Accord-
ing to a Committee spokesperson, the plan may be introduced in the Senate,
where chances for more favorable committee action exist, or in a Special
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The purpose of this Comment is to analyze the justifications of-
fered for federal legislation, to critique the Ford plan and to offer
an alternative policy option.
THE JUSTIFICATION FOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION
Before 1980, utilities must raise approximately $140 billion to fi-
nance expansion.7 Declining profits make it difficult to attract
equity investors.8 In particular, the utilities have been unable to
obtain greater debt capital because they are approaching the legal
limits for the issuance of additional debt 9 and competing sectors
Subcommittee on Capital Formation of the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee. Telephone conversation, Oct. 31, 1975. See also Wall Street J., Oct.
29, 1975, at 4, cols. 2-3 (pac. ed.). (The Wall Street Journal is bound in
the eastern edition); Id., Oct. 30, 1975, at 2, cols. 3-4; notes 39, 62, 69 infra.
But cf. id., Nov. 21, 1975, at 3, col. 2 (pac. ed.) (The Wall Street Journal is
bound in the eastern edition) (Senate resolution "severely limits the ability
of the Senate to widen any House-approved tax cuts.").
The tentative title of Ford's plan is the Electric Power Facility Construc-
tion Incentive Act of 1975. See also DES 75-4; FEA, DRAFT ENVIRoNmENTAL
IMPACT STATEiVIENT ENERGY INDEPENDENCE ACT OF 1975 AND RELATED TAx
PRoPosALs 9-1 to 9-8 (DES 75-2, 1975) on file with the Federal Energy Ad-
ministration, 40 Fed. Reg. 20462 (1975); Federal Energy Administration, In-
flationary Impact Evaluation of the Proposed Electric Power Facility Con-
struction Incentive Act of 1975 (prepared by the Office of Economic Impact
of the Office of Analysis, July 25, 1975) (obtainable from the Federal
Energy Administration). H.R. -, Electric Power Facility Construction
Incentive Act of 1975 (obtainable from the Department of the Treasury);
Technical Explanation of the Electric Power Facility Construction Incentive
Act of 1975 (obtainable from the Department of the Treasury); Electric
Power Facility Construction Act of 1975 Letter of Transmittal to the Con-
gress (obtainable from the Department of the Treasury).
7. WEIDENBAum 436. See generally Jones, The Need for Capital, 28
NAT'L TAX J. 265 (1975).
8. See Wz ENBAum 442-50.
9. Utility long-term debt indentures require that the company maintain
a specified minimum ratio of earnings to interest charges, the coverage ratio.
Increased debt financing becomes more difficult when this ratio declines
because prior indentures limit the issuance of additional debt and bond rat-
ings decline concomitantly with a consequent rise in interest costs. Present
coverage ratios are approaching mmimum requirements and profitability
continues to decline. WEiDENBAum 453-59. Those Public Utility Holding
Companies subject to regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) must also meet the SEC's coverage ratios. Id. at 511. Finally,
the utilities would ultimately be limited in their ability to raise external
capital by state laws which require minimum coverage ratios (or the like)
before certain investors can invest in a corporation. Id. at 512. See, e.g.,
CAL. Fro. CODE § 1366(a) (West Supp. 1975), amending §§ 1366, 1366(b)
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of the economy have become more attractive to investors.10
Utility rates are primarily determined by state regulatory com-
missions."1 Judicial decisions on utility financing have had a lim-
ited impact on capitalization. The Supreme Court has set standards
as to the fair rate of return on investment which state regulatory
commmissions must grant any public utility, but the commissions are
still responsible for the substantive decisions which determine util-
ity rates.' 2 Faced with consumer opposition, these commissions
have been reluctant to approve higher rates.'3
(West 1968); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-96(11) (1969); IowA CODE ANN.
§ 682.23 (9) (1950); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 9, § 626 (Supp. 1974-75); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 168, § 46(b) (1971); MN. STAT. ANN. § 50.14(11)
(1970); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 387:8(1) (1968); N.Y. BANK LAw § 235(13) (d) (McKinney Supp. 1974-75), amending §§ 235(13), 235 (26) (a) (Mc-
Kinney 1954); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-309 (1955); WASH. REV. CODE §
32.20.170 (1974).
10. WEmENBAUm 474-77.
11. Hamer, Future of Utilities, 1 EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPORTS 185, 194-95
(1975).
12. The leading case is FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603
(1944), rev'g, 134 F.2d 287 (1943). See also Permian Basin Area Rate Cases,
390 U.S. 747 (1968); United Gas v. Callery Properties, 382 U.S. 223 (1965);
Atlantic Rfg. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959); FPC v. Pipeline
Co., 315 U.S. 575 (1942); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898); Munn v. Illi-
nois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877); C. P~amaIs, THE EcoNoMVcs OF REGULATION 45-84,
261-68 (1965).
13. Hamer, supra note 11, at 194-96; Hickman, Tax Equity and the Needfor Capital, 28 NATL TAX J. 282, 285 (1975). The Administration had "jaw-
boned" state regulatory commissions for higher utility rates. Hamer, supra
note 11, at 189. See, e.g., Wall Street J., Oct. 29, 1974, at 4, col. 2, id., July 9,
1974, at 14, col. 1 (statements by former Federal Energy Administrator John
Sawhill). Recently, an Administration task force to reduce "impediments
to the completion of electric utility plants... " addressed problems which
may include unreasonable environmental restrictions and delays in
processing papers, financing, regulatory delay, collective bargaining
disputes, production delays in components, design issues, etc. This
task force can expedite the completion of electric utility plants and
getting power on stream. Tax Reform Hearings: Hearings on Tax
Reform and Capital Formation and Tax Proposals Concerning Elec-
tric Utilities Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess., at 59 (statement of the President's Labor-Manage-
ment Committee, 1975).
'While the operational effect of the task force is too recent to evaluate, excess
federal intervention in state decision-making will probably result. Utilities
have traditionally held the inside track at state regulatory commission
hearings because of the hearings' obscurity and complexity. See WEmIDN-
BAmW 483. An emergent consumer and environmental movement is only
now providing a counterweight to utility persuasiveness. See Hamer, supra
note 11, at 196. Given the goal of "getting power on stream," the "task
force" will downplay consumer and environmental concerns.
Furthermore, who will decide what constitutes an "unreasonable environ-
mental restriction" is not clear, much less what is an "unreasonable environ-
mental restriction."
Asked... if the troubleshooters might intervene on the side of
[voL. 13: 331, 1976] Comments
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Nor can firms increase the funds generated internally through
depreciation. In Commissioner v. Idaho Power,14 the Supreme
Court required a power company to depreciate trucks used to con-
struct a transmission line over the longer useful life of the trans-
mission line rather than the ten-year composite life of the
trucks.15 The Court held that section 263(a) 16 of the Internal
Revenue Code required capitalization of depreciation on equipment
used to build self-constructed capital assets (the transmission line's
useful life) despite the depreciation deduction provisions of section
167(a).17
Idaho Power deprives the utility industry as a whole of $40 mil-
lion dollars otherwise available for investment 8 and shows why
a judicial response to utility financing is inadequate. The Court
was primarily concerned "with the necessity to treat construction-
related depreciation in a manner that comports with accounting and
taxation realities."' 9 Defining its role as one of interpreting the
a utility and against environmentalists in some disputes, Federal
Energy Administrator Frank Zarb smiled and said he hoped it
wouldn't come to that. He said the troubleshooters might try to
engineer a compromise in such a case. Wall Street J., June 16,
1975, at 4, col. 4.
Finally, these "task forces" are an improper allocation of decision-making
power. Problems of where and when to place a power plant are unique
to the state in which the plant is built. See RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE
STAFF REPORT, U.S. ENERGY POLIcIES 80 (1968). But see ENERGY POLICY
PROJECT OF THE FORD FOUNDATION, A TIviE TO CHOOSE: AMERCA'S ENERGY
FUTURE 260-68 (1974) (advocating regional control with public representa-
tion) [hereinafter cited as EPP].
In sum, state regulatory commissions have not responded to the alleged
shortage of utility capital. But see Maryland Public Broadcasting System,
"Wall Street Week #506," Sept. 5, 1975, at 17: "[U]tility commissions
... are being more lenient in allowing . . .rate increases. . . ." State-
ment of Paula Hughes, Vice-President of Thomson & McKinnon Auchincloss
Kohlmeyer. (Transcripts may be obtained from Wall Street Week, P.O.
Box 85, Owings Mills, Md., 21117.) Federal pressure on the state commis-
sions borders on an improper infringement of state decision-making power
and has limited effect.
14. 418 U.S. 1 (1974), rev'g, 477 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'g, 29 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 383 (1970).
15. Id. at 5-6.
16. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 263 (a).
17. Id. § 167(a).
18. Solicitor General's Brief for Certiorari at , Commissioner v. Idaho
Power, 418 U.S. 1 (1974), cited in Lennon, Does Supreme Court's Idaho
Power Decision Endanger Other Capital-Related Deductions?, 41 J. TAx. 146,
147 (1974).
19. 418 U.S. at 10.
Internal Revenue Code made it inappropriate for the Court to write
a utility financing exemption into the Code.
Given the inadequacies of a regulatory, executive, or judicial re-
sponse to the utility financing problem, the Administration has ad-
vocated tax incentives to encourage construction of nonpetroleum
power plants.20
THE FoRD PLAN
Investment Tax Credit and Depreciation
With respect to the Investment Tax Credit (ITC) and deprecia-
tion, the Ford plan would:21
(1) Increase the ITC permanently to 12 percent on all electric
utility property except generating facilities fueled by petroleum
products .... 22
(2) Give electric utilities full, immediate ITC on progress pay-
ments for construction of property that takes two years or more
to build, except generating facilities fueled by petroleum products,
without regard to the five-year phase-in required by the Tax Re-
duction Act of 1975.23
(3) Extend to January 1, 1981, the period during which pollution
control facilities installed in a pre-1969 plant or facility may qualify
for rapid five-year straight-line amortization .... 24
(4) Permit rapid five-year amortization of the costs of either
converting a generating facility fueled by petroleum products into
a facility not fueled by petroleum products or replacing a petrole-
um-fueled facility with one not fueled by petroleum .... 25
(5) Permit a utility to elect to begin depreciation, during the
construction period .... 26
Other than (3), the pollution clause, the plan would apply only
if the state regulatory commission allowed the utility to include
20. See generally FEA, DRAFT ENVIRONmENTAL I1iPAcT STATEMENT EN-
ERGY INDEPENDEN c ACT OF 1975 AND RELATED TAX PROPOSALS (DES 75-2,
1975) on file with the Federal Energy Administration, 40 Fed. Reg. 20462
(1975).
21. Simon 51-52 (footnotes added).
22. The present codification of the ITC is INT. REV. CODE oF 1954, §
46 (a) (1).
23. The five-year phase-in requirements, id. § 46 (d) (7), were provided
by the Tax Reduction Act of 1975.
24. INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, § 169.
25. A similar provision is not presently in the Internal Revenue Code.
Similar bills have been previously introduced. See H. 8351, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1975).
26. Basically, these would be the same expenditures as those which qual-
ify for an ITC on construction payments under the Tax Reduction Act of
1975, codified at INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 46 (d) (2)- (4).
[voL. 13: 331, 1976] Comments
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the applicable expenditure within the utility's rate base27 and to
keep the monies saved by the tax cut in order to normalize the
tax advantage for ratemaking purposes.28 When certain regulated
utilities were shifting from straight-line depreciation to accelerated
depreciation methods
some regulatory agencies required them to reduce their rates
("flow through") from the resulting tax saving .... An alterna-
tive to flow-through is the normalization method of accounting.
Under this method, the tax savings from accelerated depreciation
are set up in a reserve to offset future tax expense when accel-
erated depreciation runs out.29
Obviously, the deferred taxation funds will be invested until the
tax is paid. It is anticipated that the funds will be used to construct
additional power plants.30 Normalization is essential to the Ford
plan for if "the entire tax benefit would flow through immediately
in the form of reduced utility rates for consumers. . . no real eco-
nomic benefit would result for the utility"3 1 and hence no addi-
tional construction would occur in the industry.
The Ford plan would allow the utilities $3.7 billion in interest
and tax savings during the 1975-80 period.3 2 For fiscal year 1976.
the program would cost the Treasury between $600 million33 and
27. In simplest terms, regulators perform two tasks. The first is to
determine the company's "overall revenue requirements." These
must be sufficient to cover all costs (which include operating ex-
penses, depreciation, interest, and taxes) and to yield a fair profit,
or "rate of return," which enables the company to attract the neces-
sary capital for maintenance and expansion of its services. The
second task is to devise the appropriate rate structure, consisting
of a schedule of charges which, when applied to the various serv-
ices that the company provides, will satisfy the overall revenue re-
quirements. For both of these steps it is necessary to determine
the value of the "rate base"-the company's capital investment in
plant and equipment used in providing each regulated service-be-
cause the amount of profit that the company is allowed to earn
is expressed as a percentage of the rate base. RALPH NADER'S STUDY
GROUP REPORT ON REGuLATIox AND Co1~mETroN, THE MONOPOLY
IvR:ERs 5 (1973), cited in WEmENBAumV 479.
28. Simon 51-52.
29. PRENTMcE-HALL, FDERAL TAX COURSE 1976 at 2018-19 (1975).
30. See Simon 49-50.
31. Id. at 51.
32. The Office of Economic Impact of the Office of Analysis of the Fed-
eral Energy Administration, Inflationary Impact Evaluation of the Proposed
Electric Power Facility Construction Incentive Act of 1975 at 12, July 25,
1975.
33. Simon 53.
$1 billion.34 Future costs would increase as the utilities took ad-
vantage of the program by increasing construction of power plants.
The Ford plan would provide "a cash contribution by the federal
government for the construction of additional electric power
plants"35 through the ITC and an "interest-free loan"3' 0 through
the normalized depreciation provisions. The plan ideally should re-
duce American dependence upon foreign oil by reducing our need
for oil, increase the number of jobs in the construction industry,
and provide for an assured source of electrical energy into the fu-
ture.37 Because the plan will provide the utilities with additional
investment capital, it should also reduce the pressure on the capi-
tal markets which the utilities would otherwise exert in search of
additional investment funds.3 8
Three specific problems with the Ford plan should be highlighted
before turning to its conceptual weaknesses. First, the ITC may
be excessive. The Tax Reduction Act of 1975 (TRA) has already
increased the ITC for utilities from four percent to ten percent. 0
Furthermore, the TRA altered the "percent-of-tax limitation" on
the ITC with respect to public utility property. Prior to 1975, all
businesses could take a fall credit for qualified investment prop-
erty up to $25,000 of their tax liability and then a 50 percent credit
on their tax liability in excess of $25,000.40 The TRA provided
that if 75 percent or more of a public utility's property is qualified
34. Wall Street J., June 16, 1975, at 4, col. 2.
35. Simon 53.
36. Coen, The Effect of Cash Flow on the Speed of Adjustment, in TAX
INCENTVEs AND CAPrrAL SPENDIG 135, 153-63 (G. Fromm ed. 1971) (Paper
presented at a Brookings Institution conference on Studies of Government
Finance held on November 3, 1967); Eisner, Business Investment Prefer-
ences, 42 GEO. WAsH. L. Rnv. 486, 488 (1974).
37. Simon 49.
38. FEA [Federal Energy Administration] has selectively advocated
two . .. accounting practices designed to increase availability of
internal capital. These practices are: a provision for allowance of
funds used during construction (AFDC) and a provision for con-
struction work in progress included in the rate base (CWIP).
These devices are designed to increase internal cash flow and
thereby reduce external capital needs. Letter from Donald B.
Craven, Acting Assistant Administrator, Energy Resource Develop-
ment, FEA to Brandon Becker, Sept. 3, 1975.
But cf. Keith, Importance of the Depreciation Deduction to the Economy,
40 TAxEs 163 (1962).
39. Tax Reduction Act of 1975, codified at INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, § 46(c)
(3) (A) (temporary rate increase to ten percent in 1975 and 1976). The
House Ways and Means Committee voted, 25 to 9, to extend the ten percent
ITC through 1980. Wall Street J., Oct. 29, 1975, at 4, col. 2, (pac. ed.) (The
Wall Street Journal is bound in the eastern edition).
40. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 1, § 46 (a) (1), - Stat.
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investment property, there would be no percent-of-tax limitation
in 1975 or 1976.41 The 50 percent maximum would be phased back
in by reducing the percentage by ten percent for each year begin-
ning with 1977.42 Thus, the limit for 1977 is $25,000 tax liability
plus 90 percent of the tax liability in excess of $25,000. In effect,
the maximum of 50 percent will be reinstated by 1981. Therefore,
when the Secretary of the Treasury noted that although the ITC
would be increased "[n] o change of the percent-of-tax limitation
is involved,"43 it should be recognized that the utilities already
have been given a tax incentive by last year's Congress, both
through an increase in the percent of investment qualified for the
ITC and the percent-of-tax limitation. Thus, the effect of the TRA
may be a sufficient incentive for the construction of additional
power plants. 44
A second specific problem is exemplified by Secretary Simon's
statement:
[B]ecause of the limitation that the [ITC] may be used only to
offset tax liability, the regulatory commissions will have to do their
part by setting rates that are sufficient to create a reasonable profit
and a tax liability against which the credit can be offset.45
In other words, utility taxes may be so low that they cannot take
advantage of the ITC. In fact, this may very well be the case for
a significant number of utility companies:
[F]ederal tax payments by privately owned [power] companies
have been declining steadily for the past decade or more, because
of various tax benefits accorded utilities. [F]ederal income tax
payments of the nation's Class A and B privately owned utilities
dropped in 1973 to a record average low of 2.6 percent of their op-
erating revenues. Forty-nine of the nation's investor owned com-
panies paid no federal income tax at all. 46
This could lead to the Kafkaesque situation where a regulatory
commission might be encouraged to set higher rates merely to take
41. Tax Reduction Act of 1975, codified at INT. REV. CODE or 1954, § 46 (a)
(6).
42. Id. § 46 (a) (6) (C).
43. Simon 51.
44. See text accompanying note 98 infra.
45. Simon 53.
46. EPP, supra note 13, at 391-92 (statement by Alex Radin, General
Manager, American Pub. Power Assoc.).
advantage of the federal loan. The consumer would lose twice:
He would pay more for electricity and he would pay indirectly for
the tax incentive program, either through higher taxes, reduced so-
cial programs, or higher interest rates brought about by increased
federal deficit spending.
The third specific objection is that elimination of the phase-in
requirements for an ITC on progress payments is questionable. The
Administration argues that these costs should be reflected as quali-
fied investments for the determination of the ITC. 47 Admittedly
it takes a long time to construct a power plant; estimates range
from four to seven years depending on the type of plant con-
structed.48 The TRA already has recognized this problem and pro-
vided the taxpayer with the option of taking an advanced ITC on
the progress payments paid during the construction period before
the property is placed in service.49 But the TRA provided for a
five-year phase-in of the progress payments provision. 0 The Ad-
ministration would eliminate the phase-in requirement as to utility
progress payments. Yet the Administration has not explained why
the utilities should be exempt from the concern which Congress
originally voiced in enacting the phase-in provision. The phase-
in is designed
to minimize the possible doubling up effect of these [progress pay-
ment] provisions, where taxpayers would be taking [ITCs] for all
property placed in service this year (even though progress pay-
ments had been made with respect to that property in prior
years) as well as progress payments made in the year [in which
the property is placed in service.] 5 1
47. See Simon 53.
48. Plumlee, Perspectives in U.S. Energy Resource Development, 3
ENvmoN. ArrAms 1, 13 (1974).
49. Tax Reduction Act of 1975, codified at INT. Rrv. CODE OF 1954, § 46 (d)(1).
50. Id. § 46(d) (7).
To avoid doubling up of investment credits in 1975 (credits could
be claimed on both property placed in service as well as progress
payments), the progress payments rule is phased in over a five-
year period at the rate of 20 percent a year.
Of the qualifying progress expenditures for 1975, 20 percent
would qualify for advance credits. In 1976, 40 percent of qualifying
progress expenditures, plus 20 percent of 1975 expenditures, would
be available for advance credits. In 1977, 60 percent of qualifying
progress expenditures in that year, plus 20 percent of both 1976 and
1975 expenditures, would be available. By 1979, the rule is sched-
uled to be completely phased in, with all progress expenditures
qualifying for advance credits. CCH, TAx REDUCTION ACT OF 1975
193 (Current Law Handybook ed. 1975).
51. House Ways and Means Committee Explanation of Tax Reduction Act
of 1975, in CCH, supra note 50, 513.
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There is no reason to believe that the "doubling up effect" originally
feared by the House Ways and Means Committee would not occur
with respect to the utilities under the Administration's plan.
Aside from these specific criticisms of the Ford proposal, there
are other reasons why the program should be questioned. First,
there is a vertical equity problem.52 The ITC and depreciation
provisions are linked to the amount of qualified investment prop-
erty which each utility holds. The more dollars which an utility
can invest, the more tax savings the company can generate for it-
self. Therefore, those utilities which are most in need will presum-
ably acquire the least tax dollars because they will be limited in
their ability to increase their investments. It might be argued that
this is the proper result because the tax money should be spent
only on those utilities which are competent enough to be profitable.
Unfortunately, competency in this area may often be defined as the
ability of management to obtain either favorable rate increases or
reduced state and local taxes.53 Thus, because success in raising
large amounts of investment funds would be rewarded with more
tax dollars, the plan distributes the tax dollars neither on the basis
of management skill nor on the basis of need for the funds. The
painter has again used too broad a brush stroke.
Second, there is the decision whether society should further stim-
ulate the growth of electric power through hidden subsidies. The
Ford plan is designed to divert dollars to expand construction in
the nonpetrol based utilities. But expanding firms can obtain a
constant tax break through accelerated depreciation.54 Thus, tax
incentives designed to meet a specific problem can become a long-
term construction stimulus. Although it appears that societal de-
pendence upon nonpetrol generated electricity will increase in the
long term,55 the consumer will not pay the full production costs
52. Vertical equity is the assumption that in a progressive tax structure
higher income bracketS should pay more tax. Horizontal equity is the as-
sumption that similarly situated taxpayers should pay an equal tax.
53. E.g., regulatory commission attitudes toward higher rate increases are
now being factored into the determination of an utility's bond rating. WM-
DENBAuA 471.
54. B. BrrrxR & L. STONE, FEDERAL INcOwE, ESTATE & GIFT TAxATIoN
316 (4th ed. 1972).
55. Avery, Some Perspectives on the Energy Crisis, 33 FED. B.J. 199, 202
(1974); Darmstadter, Limiting the Demand for Energy: Possible? Prob-
able?; 2 ENviRoN. AFrAms 717, 723 (1973); Plumlee, supra note 48, at 255;
of electricity so utilization decisions are divorced from production
cost.
For example, assume that the Ford plan provided the utilities
with $100 of investment funds through the ITC. Assume further
that the revenue loss generated by the Ford plan is offset by a
$100 increase in taxes. Given these assumptions and holding all
else constant, at the end of the year, the consumer will have paid
utility bills which are based on consumption minus $100 and have
paid taxes which are based on income plus $100. "6 While the con-
sumer's bill is lower, higher federal taxes are rationalized as the
"cost" of producing electricity. Attention is thus diverted from a
viable policy alternative; electricity demand reduction.
Criticism of the Ford plan because it shifts the cost of producing
electricity from the consumer to the taxpayer is ironic. The pur-
pose of the Ford plan is to reduce dependency on foreign oil. The
reason, however, why America originally became petroleum de-
pendent was the beneficial tax incentives provided the oil indus-
try.57 Although there is a certain symmetry in replacing one tax
program with another, it is nevertheless anomalous to perpetuate
reliance on tax policy rather than market forces of price, supply,
and demand to allocate energy resources.
Not only do tax incentives misallocate resources, they also render
decision-making in a democracy more difficult. The public is de-
prived of the ability to analyze effectively the program due to the
obscurity of the tax law.
It may be that legislators and the beneficiaries of tax incentive pro-
grams ... fear that once the public is fully aware of the amounts
involved and can weigh expenditure costs against benefits received
by the nation, the tax incentives will be found wanting in many
respects. In this view, the deeper the incentive is buried in tax
technicalities and tax terminology, the more it looks like any other
technical tax provision, the more it partakes of the protective color-
ation of the tax law that can be obtained by such outward similar-
ity to ordinary tax provisions, then the more desirable the tax in-
Swidler, The Role of Energy Conservation in a National Energy Policy, 2
EEovmhq. AFAms 280, 281 (1972). The fact that electricity consumption
may increase in an absolute sense is not inconsistent with a relative reduc-
tion in the rate of growth as discussed in the text accompanying notes 98-
115 infra.
56. The figures will not necessarily be equal because there may be cer-
tain transfer costs associated with an attempt to provide the utilities with
funds. In other words, it might require higher tax increases to provide the
utilities with less money.
57. Comment, Taxation as a Tool of Natural Resource Management: Oil
as a Case Study, 1 ECOLOGY L.Q. 749, 768, 770 n.105 (1971).
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centive becomes. The public must dig hard and deep to find the
subsidy and evaluate it.5s
A less ideological, but equally important, argument is that a tax
proposal is considered by the inappropriate congressional commit-
tee.
Tax legislation.. goes to the House Ways and Means Committee
and the Senate Finance Committee. These committees would nor-
mally not consider the substantive areas involved in tax incentive
programs. Tax incentives suddenly charge them with acting on
substantive matters outside their fields of responsibility simply be-
cause the program uses the tax system.59
Finally, the question of who pays for the program arises. In-
creased taxes, reduced social spending, increased deficit spending,
or some combination thereof will be necessary to pay for a $0.6 bil-
lion to $1 billion reduction of federal revenues.60 In fact, it has
been suggested that such "tax incentives" should be viewed as "tax
expenditures" to reinforce the idea that the government is spending
money when it seeks to stimulate an economic sector through tax
incentives.6' It does not appear unreasonable to ask who pays
before the government spends.
Qualified Dividend Reinvestment Plan
The Ford plan would
[p]ermit a shareholder of a regulated public electric utility to
postpone tax on dividends paid by the utility on its common stock
by electing to take additional common stock of the utility in lieu
of cash dividends.62
58. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government
Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 705, 733-34 (1970).
59. Id. at 728-29.
60. See text accompanying notes 32-34 supra.
61. Surrey, supra note 58, at 715. Professor Surrey defines a tax expendi-
ture
as special exclusions or exemptions from income, deductions, cred-
its against tax, deferrals of tax, or preferential tax rates. They
serve ends, however, which are similar in nature to those served
in the same or other areas by direct government expenditures in
the form of grants, loans, interest subsidies, and federal insurance
or guarantees of private loans. Surrey, Federal Income Tax Re-form: The Varied Approaches Necessary to Replace Tax Expendi-
tures with Direct Governmental Assistance, 84 HARV. L. REV. 352,
353-54 (1970).
See also S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONcEPT OF TAX Ex-
PENDITURES (1973).
62. Simon 52. This is the only aspect of the Ford plan upon which the
This provision provides the utility companies with preferential ac-
cess to the private money markets because utility stock will be more
attractive to investors. The rationale for this provision is that since
part of the utility financing problem is the utility's inability to at-
tract external capital, 3 the obvious solution is to allocate a greater
portion of the funds available in the capital markets to the utility
industry.64 In addition, this provision would assist the utilities
in shifting away from their increasing reliance on debt capital and
toward greater utilization of equity capital."'
This program is inadvisable because it is a classic example of re-
source misallocation. The traditional rationale for reinvestment in
equity has been its record of strong dividend payments and the as-
surance of future dividends. Normally, utilities can assure future
dividends only if the state regulatory commissions assure the util-
ities of continued rate increases when justified by rising costs. The
Ford plan shifts this cost to the intricacies of the Internal Revenue
Code.
Furthermore, the funds provided by this provision would not go
to those utilities most in need of additional funding. Whereas the
ITC and accelerated depreciation provisions are allocated to any
utility which can muster the necessary investment capital, stock
purchases, presumably made by rational investors, will be allocated
to the selected utilities which are presently financially secure and
have obtained favorable rate increases from their state regulatory
commissions.
Finally, effective tax planning may prevent these dividends from
ever being taxed to anyone. The implicit purpose behind this pro-
vision is to induce taxpayers to invest their retirement savings in
utility stock. The dividends would not be realized until the tax-
payer was beyond his major income-producing years and therefore
would be taxed at a lower rate. The tax planner would take this
House Ways and Means Committee has acted. See note 6 supra. On the
motion of Representative Waggonner (D. La.), the Committee rejected, 14
to 11, the Ford proposal, criticizing it as "a narrow, special-interest provi-
sion that would have set a bad precedent." Wall Street J., Oct. 29, 1975,
at 4, col. 2, (pac. ed.) (The Wall Street Journal is bound in the eastern
edition).
63. "The possible sources of internal financing. consist of depreciation
and retained earnings .... ." W. BRA O N, MAcRoEcoNoMIc THEoRY AND
PoLicy 204 (1972). The basic idea is that internally generated funds are
obtained through sales to customers and externally generated funds are ob-
tained from investors, either creditors or stockholders.
64. See Department of the Treasury, Technical Explanation of the Elec-
tric Power Facility Construction Incentive Act of 1975 at 15-16.
65. Id.
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proposal one step further. If the taxpayer could retain the stock
until his death, then the decedent's legatees would acquire the prop-
erty with a basis equal to the fair market value of the stock at
the date of the decedent's death66 (or the optional valuation
date),67 Since the legatee's basis would incorporate the qualified
dividends previously paid to the decedent, immediate sale of the
stock by the legatee would produce no income to be taxed. The
possibility of the taxpayer passing the utility stock to his legatees
is limited. The average utility stock is only held for six years from
the date of purchase 8 and if the taxpayer sold any of the utility's
stock inter vivos, the first stock disposed of by -the taxpayer would
be deemed qualified dividend stock. In effect, once the taxpayer
obtained qualified dividend stock, the taxpayer would have to hold
all of that utility's stock which he owned until his death to pass
the tax exemption onto his legatees. Nevertheless, the need to pro-
vide additional funds to the utility industry does not justify allow-
ing the taxpayer to pass on the tax advantage to his legatees with-
out incurring any taxation of income.
"Lockheed-Type Loan Guarantees
Although not a portion of the original utility financing scheme of
the Administration, a provision to provide federal credit assistance to
the utility industry may be included in the Ford program.6 9 Credit
assistance would consist of either guaranteeing utility debt or the
66. INT. REv. CODE Or 1954, § 1014.
67. Id. § 2032.
68. The Office of Economic Impact of the Office of Analysis of the Fed-
eral Energy Administration, supra note 32, at 9.
69. The President's position is in a state of flux. His most recent major
policy statement is a call for the creation of an Energy Independence
Agency (EIA) "to channel $100 billion into energy projects over the next
decade." Wall Street J., Sept. 23, 1975, at 3, col. 1 (pac. ed.) (The WaIZ
Street Journal is bound in the eastern edition).
[The EIA] would guarantee private loans to industry in some cases
and would raise its own loan capital by selling its government-
backed bonds in others. In some cases, the authority might build
nuclear power plants and other major installations itself, then lease
or sell them back to private industry.
Besides its financial aid, the [EIA] would try to expedite regula-
tory decisions. It wouldn't have the power to override those deci-
sions, however. Id.
See also note 6 supra.
outright purchase of a nuclear ° power plant which would then
be leased to the utility company.71 The obvious advantage of this
type of provision is that it provides the necessary financing for util-
ity expansion.
The problems with this type of plan are more financial then legal.
In effect, this provision would only shift the utility capital require-
ments onto some other sector of the economy which does not have
the benefit of government guarantees. The Securities Industry As-
sociation explains the rationale which is supported by the available
econometric literature:7 2
Federal credit programs are preemptive in their demand for credit
and generate heightened competition for funds and higher interest
rates. In effect, federal agency lending operations take would-be
debtors that have been price-rationed out of the capital markets
and reinject them as an agency borrowing with federal government
backing. Since these programs do not increase the total supply of
savings in the economy, their operation merely pushes the pres-
sures along. Market rates of interest go up to create a new margin
of hardship cases in some area that is not insulated.
Federal credit programs can be perverse in their impact on mone-
tary and fiscal policy. Under [the present] conditions of restrictive
credit, when monetary policy is forced to work overtime to curb
demands by squeezing out would-be borrowers, the injection of
new, strongly-positioned demands by federal agencies intensifies
the restraint.73
Those sectors of the economy which would be forced out 7 4 of the
70. The nuclear energy debate is beyond the scope of this Comment.Compare Green, Nuclear Power, Risk, Liability and Indemnity, 71 Mici. L.
REv. 479 (1973) with Palfrey, Energy and the Environment: The Special
Case of Nuclear Power, 74 COLum. L. REV. 1375 (1974). Professor Green,
anti-nuclear, and Professor Palfrey, pro-nuclear, are both former Commis-
sioners of the late Atomic Energy Commission.
71. Wall Street J., Sept. 23, 1975, at 3, col. 1 (pac. ed.) (The Wall Street
Journal is bound in the eastern edition).
72. Weidenbaum, Dangers in U.S. Aid for Utilities, Wall Street J., Jan.
23, 1975, at 14, col. 3.
73. Federal Financing Authority: Hearings on S. 1015, S. 1699, S. 3001,
& S. 3215 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., at 105 (1975).
74. See EPP 383 (statement by Michael McCloskey, Executive Director,
Sierra Club); WEmMAum 501-505; Kaufman, Federal Debt Management:
An Economist's View from the Marketplace, in IssuEs nr F=zERAL DEBT
MANAGE-mNT 155, 173 (conference series no. 10, Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston, 1973) (view of partner & economist of Salomon Brothers invest-
ment firm); Maclaury, Federal Credit Programs--The Issues They Raise,
in id. 205, 217 (President, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis); Weiden-
baum, Dangers in U.S. Aid for Utilities, Wall Street J., Jan. 23, 1975, at
14, col. 3.
An Administration response to this criticism might be twofold. First, the
small borrower will not be forced out of the capital markets in an absolute
sense, the borrower will just have to pay higher interest rates.
Any increase in the demand for a limited commodity such as capi-
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capital markets include state and local bonding7 5 housing(6 and
agriculture.77
Lastly, if the Federal Reserve Board pursued an expansionary
monetary policy to meet the additional capital demands generated
tal has the effect of restricting the availability and increasing the
cost. The direct effect of Federal deficits and energy financing is
therefore, more a question of what it will cost, relative to the Small
borrower's ability to pay, than its general availability. Letter from
Donald P. Craven, Acting Assistant Administrator, Energy Re-
source Development, FEA to Brandon Becker, Sept. 3, 1975.
Second, capital markets will expand to absorb future capital demands.
It is generally acknowledged that increased demand for funds in
the capital markets on the part of government and other high-rated
borrowers can, in times of tight money, restrict credit availability
to lower rated corporate borrowers and the housing sector. There
are those who believe that "crowding out" is and will become a
significant factor in the credit markets in the years ahead. There
are also those who believe that a growing economy over the next
decade, with appropriately steady fiscal and monetary policies, will
manage to generate sufficient capital for all those credit-worthy
borrowers that come to market. Letter from Henry H. Perritt, Jr.,
Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Policy Review of the De-
partment of Labor, to Brandon Becker, Oct. 6, 1975.
The second line of analysis begs the question with the term "credit-worthy
borrowers."
75. "The overriding urban problems of the coming decade may well be
the general inability of large city governments to make ends meet." SET-
TING NATIONAL PRiORIIs 291 (C. Schultze ed. 1973). The municipal bond
market is presently inadequate to meet future capital requirements of the
cities. Morris, Tax Exemption for State and Local Bonds, 42 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 526, 536 (1974). The injection of stronger borrowers within the cap-
ital market will force out municipal bonds. See note 74 supra. See gener-
ally FWANCING STATE AD LocAL GOVERNmENTS (conference series no. 3,
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston ed. 1970).
76. "An increase of one percentage point in the interest rate lowers hous-
ing expenditure by $2 billion within nine months and by $3 billion after
a year." L. RIrTR & W. Sirx.iE, MoNEY 60 (1970). An increase in the de-
mands for capital within the money markets will force out the housing sec-
tor or increase interest rates. See note 74 supra. See generally HousInG
AND MONETARY POLICY (conference series no. 4, Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston ed. 1970).
77. Famine faces some 400 million people in the poor areas of the world
today and the "prospect of starvation for increasing millions in future years"
continues unabated. U.S. Policy and World Food Needs: Hearings Before
the Subcomms. on Intl Organizations & Movements and Foreign Econ.
Policy of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 1
(Congressperson Fraser, 1974). Increasing utilization of fertilizer is the key
to greater crop yields. Georgescue-Roegen, Energy and Economic Myths,
41 So. EcoN. J. 347, 373 (1975); Nelson, Agriculture and Energy: A Legal
Perspective, 54 NEB. L. Rzv. 325, 328-29 (1975). Significant amounts of
increased capital investment will be required to produce more fertilizer.
by federal credit assistance, greater long-run inflation would re-
sult.7s
A!N ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: THE REDUCTION OF
CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS
The previous section assumed that projected capital requirements
for the electric utility industry were equivalent to necessary capi-
tal expenditures. In contrast, this section will assume that the pro-
jected shortfall of capital availability within the electric utility in-
dustry indicates that the necessary capital expenditures must be
reduced so that capital needs are equivalent to capital availability.
The Acting Assistant Administrator for Energy Resource Develop-
ment of the Federal Energy Administration (FEA) explains:
A direct relationship exists between the capital requirements of the
electric utility industry and the projected demand. The capital re-
quirements of the industry are determined by projecting future
electricity demand and calculating the degree of physical expansion
which will be necessary to meet the future demand. Historical
growth patterns in themselves represent only a specific level of ex-
pansion and therefore are only useful as possible indicators of fu-
ture demand patterns. As the level of electricity growth expands
and contracts, so also do the industry's capital requirements.7 9
Since the projections for the electric utilities' future capital require-
ments have been primarily determined by an extrapolation of past
trends, 0 alterations in the present pattern of electricity production
and consumption could significantly reduce future requirements for
utility capital.
There are two ways to reduce the future capital requirements
of the industry-minimize the cost of producing electricity or re-
U.S. Policy and World Food Need, supra at 12, 14 (statement by Lester
Brown and Erik Eckholm, Senior Fellows with the Overseas Development
Council), at 74-75 (statement by Raymond Ewell, Prof. of Chemical Eng'r,
S.U.N.Y. at Buffalo). Farming will increasingly rely upon external financ-
ing from the available capital markets. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC Coor-
ERATION AND DELOPMENT, 2 CAPITAL AND FINANCE IN AGRICULTURE 7, 53
(1970). See Note, World Hunger and International Trade: An Analysis
and a Proposal for Action, 84 YALE L.J. 1046, 1076-77 (1975) advocating $6.5
to $7 billion annual investment in developing market countries to increase
food production and stabilize population growth. It is likely that agricul-
ture could be one of the small borrowers forced out of the capital markets
by the preemption of capital which would result from federal support for
energy financing. See generally note 74 supra.
78. See Bechter, Money and Inflation, FEDERAL RESERVE BANCK OF K.C.
MONTHLY REV. 3, 6 (July-Aug. 1973) (results the same under a structural
and monetarist model).
79. Letter from Donald P. Craven, Acting Assistant Administrator, En-
ergy Resource Development, PEA to Brandon Becker, Sept. 3, 1975.
80. A. HAVIMOND, W. MEz, & T. M.AuGE, ENERGY Am THE FUTURE 139,
142 (1973).
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duce the demand for electricity. The Ford plan does not address
either alternative. Rather the Ford plan apparently assumes that
the only alternative to the capital shortage within the utility indus-
try is to provide the utilities with more money.
Interconnection
Production costs for electric utilities will not require less capital
investment in the foreseeable future.81 Even so, gross investment
could be reduced by a system of interconnection. Interconnection
is the process by which one power company provides another power
company with additional electricity82 and is designed to take ad-
vantage of the demand diversity which exists between individual
power companies8 3 For example, if one power company experi-
ences its greatest demand for electricity during four to six in the
evening, eastern standard time, and another company has its peak
demand period during four to six, central standard time, it may
be possible for the central company to transfer power to the eastern
company when the central company plants are not operating at full
capacity. This transfer of power would reduce the need for both
companies to build additional plants to meet their individual peak
demand requirements.
Time zone diversity is only one example of how interconnection
can reduce costs. The capital expenditure savings generated by in-
terconnection result from the fact that the industry as a whole does
not have to build additional plants to meet the demand require-
81. See, e.g., Financial Requirements of the Nation's Energy Industries:
Hearings on S. Res. 45 Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular
Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 93-5 (92-40), at 13 (statement of William
Pelly, Vice-President, Petroleum Dep't, First Nat'l City Bank) (15 year lag
until technological changes have capital impacts); Plumlee, supra note 48,
at 23 (solar capital costs will exceed present capital costs for present
plants); INTEcNoLoGY CoRp., 1 THE U.S. ENERGY PROBLE1 SUmmARY 60
(1971) (capital costs for an ocean thermal gradient system would exceed
world monetary resources).
82. S. BREYER & P. MAcAvoY, ENERGY REGULATION BY THE FEDERAL PoWER
COmmissiON 97-99 (1974). The Breyer and MacAvoy work for the Brook-
ings Institution first appeared as Breyer & MacAvoy, The Natural Gas
Shortage and the Regulation of Natural Gas Producers, 86 HARv. L. REv.
941, (1973), reprinted in Fiscal Policy and the Energy Crisis: Hearings on
S. 2806 Before the Subcomm. on Energy of the Senate Comm. on Finance,
93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 835 (1973).
83. S. BREYER, supra note 82, at 92-93.
ments of individual companies. In other words, a national power
grid is established to take advantage of what would otherwise be
excessive duplication within the entire system.8 4
The debate within the utility industry has focused on the dollar
amount which can be saved through greater interconnection at this
time. The industry has argued that they have already achieved
the fullest degree of interconnection possible at this time.8 5 Indus-
try critics, however, contend that intra-industry rivalry has frus-
trated attempts to achieve full interconnection.8 6 The dollar esti-
mates have varied from an industry suggestion that greater inter-
connection would be more expensive87 to a critical view which sug-
gests savings as high as $10 billion.88 The "reasonable and con-
servative" estimate of "total annual savings of $2 billion" by a re-
cent Brookings publication appears to strike a happy medium.8 9
The Ford plan is designed to provide the utilities with 3.7 billion
dollars. Thus, effective interconnection might save the consumer
54 percent of the funds which the Ford program is designed to pro-
vide through tax incentives and higher prices.
Demand Reduction
If the demand for electricity is reduced, capital expenditures will
also be reduced because if less electricity is consumed fewer plants
have to be built.90 There are basically two ways to reduce demand
for additional electricity; government regulation and higher prices.
Although the vagaries of governmental intervention in the market-
place are dependent upon future elections, electricity prices will
surely rise.9 1 The question is whether the price increases which
the utilities have obtained92 and will obtain in the future, will
84. EPP 261-62.
85. WEmID-BAum 524.
86. Note, Electric-Utility Interconnections: Power to People, 21 STAIr.
L. REv. 1714 (1969).
87. WEIDENBAUm 524.
88. EPP 262.
89. S. BRYm & P. MAcAvoy, supra note 82, at 107.
90. Although this is true in the aggregate, specific cases may differ. For
example, demand might decrease with respect to a particular utility com-
pany's total production, but the demand might increase during a specific
time period which required the construction of additional power plants to
meet that demand period.
91. Avery, supra note 55, at 202; Joskow, Inflation and Environmental
Concern: Structural Change in the Process of Public Utility Price Regula-
tion, 17 J. LAw & EcoN. 291, 326 (1974).
92. Since 1970, however, electric rates have gone up faster than the
overall cost of living-three to four times faster in 1974 .... Last
year [regulatory] commissions approved a total of $2.2 billion in
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reduce the future demand for electricity such that the projected
capital needs of the utilities will not develop in the future.
The consensus of economists is that in the long run, higher prices
for electricity will reduce demand.9 3 The economists cannot say
with certainty or authority how much demand will be reduced or
when it will be reduced.9 4 Even so, the most recent demand
studies indicate a sharp drop in consumption levels. The pre-1974
studies, were based on the continuation of an historical growth rate
of seven percent.9 5 The post-1974 studies, which are only now be-
ginning to appear, indicate that the future growth of electricity con-
sumption will be approximately five and one-half percent annually,
a figure one and one-half percent lower than pre-1974 predictions.9 6
Since virtually all of the projected capital investment of the elec-
tric utilities will be devoted to the expansion of capacity, demand
reduction should have a substantial impact upon future capital re-
quirements.9 7 It is estimated that demand reduction will lower
utility capital requirements by as much as 33 percent.98
The implications of reduced capital requirements are presently
filtering through the utility industry.
Already there is some evidence that the slower growth in electric-
ity sales and the resulting construction budget cutbacks in 1974 have
rate increases, and early in 1975 they were being asked to approve
more than $4 billion more. Hamer, supra note 11, at 188.
93. Taylor, The Demand for Electricity: A Survey, 6 BELL J. EcoN. 74,
100-06 (1975); BuswEsswEax, Feb. 2, 1974, at 34.
94. Darmstadter, supra note 55, at 728.
95. A. Lancaster, Projections of Electricity Demand and the Capital Re-
quirements of the Electric Utility Industry at 1, June 12, 1975 (Ms. Lancas-
ter is an Analyst in Energy Economics of the Economics Division of the
Congressional Research Service). Copies of this study may be obtained
from The Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Washington,
D.C. 20540.
96. Id. at 3.
97. OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESs, THE POTENTIAL FOR ENERGY CON-
SERVATioN at G-1 (1972).
For example, assume that capacity must be increased by five per-
cent without [demand reduction] and by four percent with [de-
mand reduction]. This reduction of one percent in the rate of
growth of consumption is a reduction of 20 percent in the growth
rate itself and thereby in the rate at which new capacity must
grow. Id.
Applying the foregoing analysis to the present statistics indicates that the
average growth rate will be reduced by as much as 21.4 percent through
1985.
98. Lancaster, supra note 95, at 10.
resulted in an improved financial condition for the industry. Bet-
ter financing terms and the increased investment tax creditf have
reportedly been responsible for electric utilities again moving
ahead with their construction plans. In a recent study completed
by the Edison Electric Institute'0 0 on economic growth, pricing and
energy use, a major policy conclusion was reached that investor-
owned utilities would opt for a moderate growth rate in electricity
sales of from 5.3 percent to 5.8 percent for the remaining quarter
of the century.1O'
The policy implications of these figures are twofold. First, the
predictions of a capital shortfall in the utility industry usually as-
sumed historical growth trends and in any case did not incorporate
the impact of higher prices. 02 Thus, the capital needs of the
utility industry will not be as great as originally forecast. And
the justification for a massive program of federal intervention
within the marketplace is reduced. Second, demand reduction
should accomplish the goals of the Ford plan. Demand reduction
reduces environmental degradation, lengthens domestic energy sup-
plies, and reduces American dependence on imported oil. 103
The primary disadvantage of demand reduction is its alleged ef-
fect on gross national production. Specifically, the Ford Adminis-
tration has argued that an incidental advantage of its program
would be increased employment within the construction indus-
try.10 4  This argument is flawed for several reasons. First, the
position is internally inconsistent. One of the justifications for the
Ford program is that the utility industry is uniquely capital-inten-
sive, as opposed to using a significant amount of labor.10 Thus,
if jobs are the policy goal, the funds could be spent more advan-
tageously by directing them to a labor-intensive industry.
Second, the reduction in economic production argument is pri-
marily applicable to government-enforced demand reduction
through regulations or legislative fiat. 0 6 In the present case, the
demand reduction will result from the price increases which the
utility industry has sought from the state regulatory commissions.
It would be logically inconsistent for the utilities to justify higher
prices at the state regulatory commissions due to their need to at-
99. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
100. Professor Weidenbaum worked under the auspices of the Edison
Electric Institute, a major utility trade association. See note 2 supra.
101. Lancaster, supra note 95, at 10-11 (emphasis & footnotes added).
102. WEiDENBAUM 472.
103. HAMMoND, supra note 80, at 131.
104. Simon, supra note 5, at 49.
105. See id. at 49, 53.
106. See, e.g., EPP 367-68 (statement by Donald C. Burnham, Chairper-
son, Westinghouse Electric Corp.).
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tract additional capital and then to argue for tax subsidies from
the federal government so that the higher prices granted at the
state level will not reduce growth.10 7
CONCLUSION
Utilities can maintain a sound financial position with moderate
rate increases from state regulatory commissions.108 Federal fi-
nancial intervention through tax incentives is only appropriate to
rectify market dislocations'0 9 created by a shift of national priori-
ties, specifically in the areas of pollution control and conversion
of petroleum plants to a nonpetroleum fuel base. If tax incentives
are granted, they should be of a short duration to assure congres-
sional reexamination of the expenditure decisions." 0
The Ford plan should not be adopted. The Tax Reduction Act
of 1975 has ameliorated many problems of capital formation within
the utility industry. Moreover, capital needs should decrease as
a consequence of demand reduction. Lastly, the utility industry
itself could increase its capital significantly through fuller intra-
industry cooperative techniques such as interconnection.
BRAmDON BECKER
107. On the other hand, it could be argued that the tax subsidy is nec-
essary as a stimulant to future growth, irrespective of the marketplace dis-
tortion such a subsidy would provide for electricity consumption. An
analysis of this position is beyond the scope of this Comment, although sev-
eral observations are appropriate. The economic stimulus argument would
have to entail a consideration of several factors: the environmental impact
stimulants to future energy consumption would generate, a comparison of
the alternative methods to stimulate future economic growth, and most im-
portantly, since most neglected, an analysis of the trade-off which would
occur by stimulating electricity growth rather than demand reduction (i.e.,
will more nuclear power plants be built to provide more energy and fewer
homes insulated to use less energy?).
108. Oil Profits and Their Effect on Small Business and Capital Invest-
ment Needs of the Energy Industries: Hearings on Future Capital Needs
of U.S. Energy Industries and the Effect these needs will have on Small
Business Before the Subcomm. m Gov't Regulation of the Senate Select
Comm. on Small Business, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 95 [statement of Prof.
Jerome Hass, Graduate School of Business & Pub. Adm'n, Cornell U., co-
author of J. HAss, E. cUTcsmu, & B. STONE, F!'NAciNG =HE NERGY IN-
DUSTRY (1974)].
109. Id. at 109. Accord, Wnmoux m 434.
110. Surrey, supra note 58, at 738.
